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Abstract
Investigative journalists collect large numbers of digital doc-
uments during their investigations. These documents could
greatly benefit other journalists’ work. However, many of
these documents contain sensitive information and their pos-
session of such documents can endanger reporters, their sto-
ries, and their sources. Thus, many documents are only used
only for single, local, investigations. We present DATASHARE,
a decentralized and privacy-preserving global search system
that enables journalists worldwide to find documents via a ded-
icated network of peers. DATASHARE combines well-known
anonymous authentication mechanisms and anonymous com-
munication primitives, a novel asynchronous messaging sys-
tem, and a novel multi-set private set intersection protocol
(MS-PSI) into a decentralized peer-to-peer private document
search engine. We show that DATASHARE is secure and scales
to thousands of users and millions of documents using a pro-
totype implementation.
1 Introduction
Investigative journalists research topics such as corruption,
crime, and corporate misbehavior. Well-known examples of
such practices are the Panama Papers, that resulted in several
politicians’ resignations and sovereign states recovering hun-
dreds of millions of dollars hidden in offshore accounts [3];
and the Boston Globe investigation on child abuse, that re-
sulted in a global crisis for the Catholic Church [5]. These in-
vestigations are essential for a healthy democracy [15]. They
provide the greater public with information kept secret by
governments and corporations, effectively holding these insti-
tutions accountable to society at large.
In order to obtain significant, fact-checked, and impactful
results, journalists require large amounts of documents. These
documents often contain sensitive and/or confidential infor-
mation. In a globalized world, local issues are increasingly
connected to global phenomena. Thus, journalists’ collec-
tions can be very relevant for other colleagues working on
related investigations. However, possessing such documents
puts journalists and their sources increasingly at risk of iden-
tification, prosecution, and persecution [34, 35]. As a result
journalists go to great lengths to protect both their documents
and their interactions with other journalists [36]. With these
risks in mind, the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists (ICIJ) approached us with the question: can a
global community of journalists search each other’s docu-
ments while minimizing the risk for them and their sources?
To build a system that addresses this question we must
solve five key challenges:
1) Avoid centralizing information. A party with access to all
the documents and journalists’ interaction would become a
very tempting target for attacks by hackers or national agen-
cies, and for legal cases and subpoenas by governments.
2) Avoid reliance on powerful decentralized infrastructure.
While ICIJ has journalists worldwide, it does not have highly-
available servers in different jurisdictions.
3) Deal with asynchrony and heterogeneity. Journalists are
spread around the world. There is no guarantee that they are
online at the same time, nor that they have the same resources.
4) Practical on commodity hardware. For the system to be
useful for journalists, they must be able to search documents
and communicate with other journalist without hindering their
day-to-day work. This requires the system to be computation-
ally and communicationally efficient.
5) Enable data sovereignty. Journalists are willing to share
but not unconditionally. Since journalists make their personal
collection searchable, they want to have control over the shar-
ing process. Journalists should be able to make informed
decisions on revealing documents on a case-by-case basis.
The first four requirements preclude the use of available
technologies in search while the fifth requirement precludes
the use of automatic and rule-based document retrievals. More
concretely, the first requirement eliminates central databases
and private information retrieval (PIR) [12, 26, 31] between
journalists, as standard PIR requires a central list of all search-
able (potentially sensitive) keywords. The second requirement
rules out multi-party computation (MPC) between distributed
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servers [28, 41, 42].
The third and fourth requirement precludes the use of
technologies that require many round trips or high band-
width between journalists such as custom private set inter-
section [18, 23, 28, 30, 43], keyword-based PIR [9, 16], and
generic MPC protocols [28, 41, 42, 51]; and they preclude
the use of privacy-preserving communication systems that
require all users to be online [32, 50].
In this paper, we introduce DATASHARENETWORK, a de-
centralized document search engine for journalists to be in-
tegrated within ICIJ’s open source tool to organize informa-
tion Datashare: [1]. DATASHARENETWORK addresses the
challenges as follows. One, journalists keep their collections
in their computers such that if they are hacked, coerced, or
corrupted, only her collection is compromised; even if an
adversary gains the ability to search others’ documents, she
cannot extract all documents nor all users in the system. Two,
we introduce a new multi-set private set intersection (MS-
PSI) protocol that enables asynchronous search and multi-
plexes queries to reduce computation and communication
cost. Three, we combine existing privacy-preserving tech-
nologies [8, 21] to build a pigeonhole-like communication
mechanism that enables journalists to anonymously converse
with each other in an unobservable manner. In the rest of the
document, for simplicity, we refer to DATASHARENETWORK
as DATASHARE.
Our contributions are as follows:
XWe elicit the security and privacy requirements of a docu-
ment search system for investigative journalists.
XWe introduce MS-PSI, a private set intersection protocol to
efficiently search in multiple databases without incurring extra
leakage with respect to traditional PSI with pre-computation.
XWe propose an asynchronous messaging system that enable
journalists to search and converse in a privacy-preserving way.
XWe design DATASHARE, a secure and privacy-preserving
decentralized document search system that protects the iden-
tity of its users, the content of the queries, and to a large
extent the collections themselves, from malicious users and
third parties. We show that DATASHARE provides the pri-
vacy properties required by journalists. Using a prototype
implementation of the core cryptographic primitives we show
that the system can easily scale to more than 1000 partici-
pants even if their document collections have more than 1000
documents.
2 Towards Building DATASHARE
We build DATASHARE at the request of ICIJ. From now on,
we may refer to ICIJ as the organization.
2.1 Requirements gathering
In order to understand the needs of investigative journalists,
ICIJ ran a survey among 70 of their members and provided
us with aggregate statistics, reported below. We refined the
requirements in weekly meetings held for more than one year
with the members of ICIJ’s Data & Research Unit, who are in
charge of the development and deployment of DATASHARE.
User base. ICIJ consists of roughly 250 permanent journalist
members in 84 countries. These members occasionally collab-
orate with external reporting partners. The maximum number
of reporters working simultaneously on an investigation has
reached 400. The organization estimates that each member
is willing to make around one thousand of their documents
available for searching. To accommodate growth we consider
that DATASHARE needs to scale to (at least) 1000 users, and
(at least) 1 million documents.
Journalists work and live all over the globe, ranging from
Sydney to San Francisco, including Nairobi and Kathmandu,
resulting in large timezone differences. Around 38% of the
journalists have a computer permanently connected to the In-
ternet, and another 53% of them only have connection during
work hours (i.e., eight hours a day, five days a week). The
rest are only connected during a few hours per day. Thus,
message delivery time can be as high as 24 hours, therefore,
the search system needs to enable asynchronous requests and
responses. Furthermore, many journalists live in regions with
low-quality networks: only half of the journalists report hav-
ing a fast connection. Thus, DATASHARE cannot require high
bandwidth.
Waiting time. As the system must be asynchronous, the sur-
vey asked journalists how much they are willing to wait to
obtain a the result of a query. A 21% of the surveyees are
willing to wait for hours, while another 56% can wait for one
or more days. Thus, DATASHARE does not need to enable
real-time search. Yet, given delivery times of up to 24 hours,
to keep search latency within a few days DATASHARE must
use protocols that can operate with just one communication
round. Therefore, multi-round techniques such as multi-party
computation [28, 41, 42, 51] incur too much delay.
Queries nature. The queries made by journalists are in a vast
majority formed by keywords called named entities: names
of organizations, people, or locations of interest. Therefore,
journalists do not require very expressive querying languages.
DATASHARE only must support queries made of conjunctions
of keywords. Journalists have interest in a small set of these
entities at a time: only those related to their current project.
Thus, queries are not expected to include more than 10 terms
at a time and each journalist is not expected to issue a large
number of queries in parallel.
During the design phase we also learned that, because most
terms of interest are investigation-specific (e.g., XKeyScore
in the Snowden leaks, or Mossack Fonseca in the Panama
Papers), a pre-defined list of terms can not cover all potentially
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relevant keywords for journalists. Therefore, techniques based
on fixed lists such as private information retrieval (PIR) [12,
26, 31] are not suitable to build DATASHARE.
Security and privacy. When asked about their security and
privacy concerns, journalists identify four types of princi-
pals: the journalists themselves, their sources, the people men-
tioned in the documents, and the organization which runs
DATASHARE. They also identify three assets: the named en-
tities in documents, the documents themselves, and the con-
versation they have during an investigation. Disclosure of
named entities could leak information about the investiga-
tion, or could harm the cited entities (who could in turn could
trigger a lawsuit). They consider whole documents to be the
most sensitive as they provide context for the named enti-
ties, worsening the situation. Finally, they fear that disclosure
of conversions could endanger the journalists involved, their
sources, the organization, and the whole investigation.
Regarding the threat model, journalists mostly consider
third party adversaries such as corporations, governments
(intelligence agencies), and organized crime. Sources and
other journalists are in general considered non-adversarial.
Similarly, journalists trust the organization as an authority
for membership and to run their infrastructure. However, the
organization does not want to be trusted for privacy to prevent
coercion and external pressures.
The main requirement for DATASHARE is thus to protect
the confidentiality of assets from third parties that are not in
the system. This naturally implies that DATASHARE cannot re-
quire journalists to send their data to third-parties for analysis,
storage, indexing, or search. Journalists are concerned about
subsets of these adversaries at a time. Therefore, DATASHARE
does not need to defend against global adversaries.
Journalists initially did not consider their colleagues as
adversaries. However, our threat analysis shows that there
is a non-negligible risk that powerful adversaries like gov-
ernments can bribe or compromise honest journalists, in par-
ticular when those journalists live in jurisdictions with less
protection for civil rights. Thus, we require that DATASHARE
must minimize the amount of information that journalists,
or the organization learn about others’ interests (searched
keywords), collections, and conversations. This ensures that
neither journalists nor the organization becomes a profitable
target for adversaries. To achieve this, we require that searches
are anonymous and the searched terms are kept confidential
with respect to both journalists and the organization.
With respect to conversations, 64% of the surveyees report
that they would prefer to stay anonymous in some cases. Fur-
thermore, 60% of the respondents declare that they prefer to
have a screening conversation before deciding to share docu-
ments. This means that search and sharing features need to
be separated to enable screening. Moreover, to provide such
protection, DATASHARE must provide anonymous means for
journalists to discuss document sharing. Conversations within
DATASHARE are expected to be short, as their only goal is to
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Figure 1: DATASHARE architecture overview.
either agree on whether to collaborate. After they agree, they
switch to an alternative secure communication channel. In
particular, DATASHARE does not provide built-in document
retrieval functionality.
2.2 Sketching DATASHARE
DATASHARE is run by ICIJ. Access to the system is exclusive
to ICIJ members, and authorized collaborators. Journalists
trust ICIJ to act as a token issuer that certifies authorized jour-
nalists. To enable journalists to stay anonymous, these tokens
are implemented using blind signatures, so that journalists can
demonstrate membership without revealing their identities.
DATASHARE assumes infrastructure to facilitate asyn-
chronous communication between journalists. It consists of:
a bulletin board that journalists use to broadcast information,
and a pigeonhole for 1-to-1 communication. Communication
between journalists and the infrastructure (pigeonhole or bul-
letin board) is anonymous. Moreover, all communication is
end-to-end encrypted (i.e., from journalist to journalist). Thus,
the infrastructure needs to be trusted for availability, but not
to protect the privacy of the journalists and their documents.
Each authorized journalist in DATASHARE owns a corpus
of documents which they make available for search. Journal-
ists can take two roles in the system: i) querier, to search
for documents of interest, and ii) document owner, to have
their corpus searched. Journalists first search for matching
documents, and then (anonymously) converse with the corre-
sponding document owners to request the document.
Figure 1 sketches DATASHARE’s architecture. First, jour-
nalists upload privacy-preserving representations of their col-
lections and contact information to the bulletin board. Then,
to issue a query, journalists construct a privacy-preserving
representation of their keywords authorized by a token, and
broadcast it using the bulletin board. Owners periodically
retrieve new queries from the bulletin board. If the authoriza-
tion is valid, they send a response back to the querier using
the pigeonhole. This response enables the querier to identify
3
Table 1: Notation.
G,g, p A cyclic group, its generator and the group’s order
` The security parmeter
x←$ X Draw x uniformly from the set X
H, Hˆ Hash functions mapping into {0,1}` resp. group G.
[n] The set {1, . . . ,n}
s,c The server’s and client’s secret keys
Yi The server’s ith set Yi = {yi,1, ..,yi,ni }
N,ni Nr. of server sets, resp. nr. of elements in set Yi
X The client’s set X = {x1, ..,xm}
m The number of elements in the client’s set
τ,τi Pretags for client (τ) resp. the server’s ith set Yi (τi)
TC The server’s tag collection
matches with the documents in the owner’s collection.
When journalists find a match in a collection, i.e., a doc-
ument that contains all the keywords in the query, they can
start a conversation with the document owner to ask them
to share the document. Document owners append a public
contact key to their collection to enable queriers to carry out
this conversation in an anonymous way via the pigeonhole.
Instantiation. DATASHARE uses four main privacy-
preserving building blocks: a multi-collection search mech-
anism, a messaging system, an anonymous communication
channel, and an authorization mechanism.
We implement the privacy-preserving search mechanism
using a novel primitive, which we call multi-set private set
intersection (MS-PSI) described in Section 3. We design a
privacy-preserving messaging system in Section 4 which
provides both the bulletin board and pigeonhole function-
ality. As anonymous communication channel, we rely on the
Tor [21] network. Finally, we use blind signatures to imple-
ment privacy-preserving authorization, see Section 5.1. Sec-
tion 5.2 explains how DATASHARE combines these building
blocks.
3 Multi-Set PSI
Private set intersection (PSI) protocols enable two parties
holding sets X and Y to compute the intersection X ∩Y with-
out revealing information about the individual elements in
the sets. We review existing PSI variants in Section 6. In
this section we introduce a multi-set private set intersection
(MS-PSI) protocol that computes intersections of set X with
N sets {Y1, . . . ,YN} at the server simultaneously.
Notation. (See Table 1) We use a cyclic group G of prime
order p generated by g. We write x←$ X to denote that x is
drawn uniformly at random from the set X . Let ` be a secu-
rity parameter. We define two hash functions H : {0,1}∗→
{0,1}` and Hˆ : {0,1}∗→G. Finally, we write [n] to denote
the set {1, . . . ,n}.
Client Server
X = {x1, ..,xm} ⊂G Y = {y1, ..,yn } ⊂G
c←$ Zp s←$ Zp
x˜i = xci
〈x˜i〉 xˆi = x˜si
Ti = H(xˆc
−1
i )
〈xˆi〉,TC TC= {H(ys) | y ∈ Y }
Return {xi |Ti ∈ TC}
Figure 2: Vanilla PSI protocol by De Cristofaro et al. [17].
Related PSI schemes. We build on the single-set PSI pro-
tocol by De Cristofaro et al. [17], see Figure 2. In this pro-
tocol, before sending her elements xi ∈ G to the server, the
client blinds them as x˜i = xci using a blinding factor c. The
server applies its own secret to the blinded elements, xˆi = x˜si ,
and sends them back to the client in the same order, to-
gether with a tag collection of her own blinded elements:
TC= {H(ys) | y ∈ Y }. The client unblinds her elements, ob-
taining a list of xsi s. She computes a tag H(x
s
i ) for each of
them and compares it to the server’s tags TC to find matching
elements.
To increase efficiency when the server set is large, client-
server PSI (C-PSI) schemes in the literature [23, 30, 48] in-
troduce optimizations to avoid that the server has to compute
and send a large fresh set of tags every execution. Instead,
the server precomputes the tag collection with a long-term se-
cret key s and send it to the client once. In subsequent online
phases, the server answers clients’ queries using the long-
term key s. This drastically improves the communication and
computation cost as the server does not compute nor send the
tag collection.
A new multi-set PSI protocol. Our multi-set private set
intersection protocol (MS-PSI) intersects a client set X =
{x1, ..,xm}⊂ {0,1}∗ with N sets Yi = {yi,1, ..,yi,ni }⊂ {0,1}∗
at the server to obtain the intersections X ∩Yi. Our protocol
computes all intersections simultaneously, lowering the com-
putation and communication cost with respect to running N
parallel PSI protocols. In DATASHARE, X contains the query
which is a conjunction of search keywords, and Yi represents
document i’s keywords. (see Section 5.2). We use Hˆ to map
keywords to group elements.
A naive approach is to mimic the client-server protocols
and reuse the long-term key s for all sets Yi. This approach,
however, maps identical elements in sets Yi,Yj to the same
tag, thus, revealing intersection cardinalities |Yi∩Yj|.
To remove the link between tags across sets, we add a tag
diversifying step to the precomputation phase of client-server
PSI (see Figure 3). We first compute pretags τi for each set Yi
by raising each element to the power of the long-term secret s.
Then, we compute per-set tags by hashing the pretags t with
the set index i to obtain H(i ‖ t). The hash-function ensures
that the tags of each set are independent. The server publishes
the tag collection TC and the number of sets N.
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Client Server
X = {x1, ..,xm} {Y1, ..,YN }
Yi = {yi,1, ..,yi,ni }
Precomputation phase
s←$ Zp
τi =
{
Hˆ(y)s | y ∈ Yi
}
TC,N TC={H(i || t) |
i ∈ [N]∧ t ∈ τi}
Online phase
c←$ Zp
x˜i = Hˆ(xi)c
〈x˜i〉 xˆi = x˜si
ti = xˆc
−1
i
〈xˆi〉
For d ∈ {1, . . . ,N} :
T(d)i = H(d || ti)
Return {Id = {xi |T(d)i ∈ TC}}d∈[N]
Figure 3: Our MS-PSI protocol.
During the online phase, the client blinds its set as in the
vanilla PSI protocol and sends it to the server. The server
re-blinds with its secret s and sends them back to the client
in the same order. The client unblinds the result to obtain the
pretags for her elements. The client then computes the corre-
sponding tags T(d), for each document d ∈ [N], and computes
the intersection.
In Appendix A we prove the following theorem to show
that the server learns nothing about the client’s set, and that
the client learns nothing more than the intersections X ∩Yi.
Theorem 1. The MS-PSI protocol is private against mali-
cious adversaries in the random oracle model for H and Hˆ,
assuming the one-more-gap Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.
The MS-PSI protocol does not provide correctness against
a malicious server. A malicious server can respond arbitrarily
which leads to the client computing an incorrect intersection.
However, Theorem 1 shows that the malicious server cannot
gain any information about the client’s set from doing so.
Performance. Table 2 compares the performance of our MS-
PSI protocol with the vanilla and the client-server PSI proto-
cols in the multi-set setting. We show the computation and
communication cost for a server with N sets and a client set
with m elements. MS-PSI reduces the server’s online com-
munication and computation by a factor N. The client can
replace expensive group operations by cheap hash computa-
tions, drastically reducing the online cost of the client as well.
The example costs for N = 1000 (in brackets) bear this out
and show an improvement of 3 orders of magnitude.
Table 2: Performance of PSI variants in a multi-set scenario:
N is the number of server sets; S the total number of server
elements; m is the size of the client set; and τe and τH denote
the cost of an exponentiation and a hash computation (τH+e =
τH + τe). We report in square brackets the cost estimation
when m = 10, N = 1000, S = 100,000 (i.e., server sets have
100 elements). We assume that group elements require 32
bytes, τe = 100µs, and τH = 1µs.
Vanilla C-PSI MS-PSI
Precomputation phase
Server — SτH+e SτH+e
Comms — S S
Online phase
Client 2mNτH+e 2mNτH+e 2mτe+mNτH
[2 s] [2 s] [12 ms]
Server SτH+e+mNτe mNτe mτe
[11 s] [1 s] [1 ms]
Comms S+2mN 2mN 2m
[3.84 MB] [640 KB] [640 B]
4 Privacy-preserving messaging
In this section, we introduce DATASHARE’s communication
system (CS). Journalists use the CS to support MS-PSI-based
search and to converse anonymously after they find a match.
The CS needs to respect the organization’s limitations (see
Section 2.1). The communication cost should not hinder the
day to day operation of journalists, and the system must sup-
port asynchronous communication. As the organization can-
not deploy non-colluding nodes, the communication system
uses one server. This server is trusted for availability, but not
for privacy.
DATASHARE’s communication system is designed to host
short conversations for discussing the sharing of documents.
We anticipate that journalists will migrate to using encrypted
email or secure messengers if they need to communicate over
a long period or they need to send documents.
4.1 Messaging system construction
The server provides two components: a bulletin board for
broadcast messages, and a pigeonhole for point-to-point mes-
sages. We use communication server to refer to the entity that
operates the bulletin board and the pigeonhole. To hide their
network identifiers from the server and network observers,
journalists always use Tor [21] when communicating with this
server. DATASHARE creates a new circuit for every request to
ensure unlinkability.
Bulletin board. The bulletin board implements a database
that stores broadcast messages. Journalists interact with the
bulletin board using two protocols: BB.broadcast(m), which
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adds a message m to the database to broadcasts it to all jour-
nalists; and m← BB.read() to retrieve any unseen messages.
Pigeonhole. The pigeonhole consists of a large number of
one-time-use mailboxes. Journalists use the pigeonhole to
send and receive replies to search-queries and conversation
messages. Journalist call PH.SendRaw (Protocol 1) to send
query replies, and use the asynchronous process PH.Recv-
Process (Protocol 2) to retrieve incoming query replies and
conversation messages. Journalists use PH.Monitor (Proto-
col 3) to receive notifications of new messages from the pi-
geonhole and to trigger PH.RecvProcess. The pigeonhole
deletes old messages. In agreement with the organization,
it deletes messages older than 7 days, as journalists are ex-
pected to connect to the system several times a week (see
Section 2.1).
Journalists are likely to initiate a conversation after receiv-
ing a successful match. To hide this event we ensure that
the sending of conversation messages is unobservable (see
Definition 1): the server cannot determine whether a user
sends a conversation message or not. This hides whether a
conversation happens, which in turn hides whether the search
revealed a match or not. To ensure unobservability of con-
versation messages, journalists run PH.Cover (Protocol 4) to
send cover messages at a constant Poisson rate to every other
journalist. To send a conversation message, it suffices to re-
place one of the cover messages with the real message (see
PH.HiddenSend, Protocol 5).
Journalists use the Diffie-Hellman key exchange to com-
pute mailbox addresses and message encryption keys. They
use different keys for different purposes. Queriers generate
a fresh key for every query and use that key to receive query
replies, and to send conversation messages associated with a
query. Document owners use a medium-term key to send
query replies and to receive conversation messages from
queriers (see Section 5.2). Moreover, journalists exchange
cover traffic. They use fresh cover keys to send cover traffic
and their medium-term keys to receive cover traffic. Journal-
ists use an authenticated encryption scheme AE to encrypt
messages.
Protocol 1 (PH.SendRaw(skS,pkR,m)). To send message m
to recipient R with public key pkR, a sender with private key
skS proceeds as follows. Let ns be the number of times S called
PH.SendRaw to send a message to R before. The sender:
1. computes the Diffie-Hellman key k′ = DH(skS,pkR);
2. computes the random rendezvous mailbox addr =
H(‘addr’ || k′ || pkS || ns) and a symmetric key k =
H(‘key’ || k′ || pkS || ns);
3. pads the message m to obtain m′ of length mlen, and
computes the ciphertext c = AE.enc(k,m′);
4. opens an anonymous connection to the pigeonhole and
uploads c to mailbox addr.
For every upload, the pigeonhole notifies all monitoring re-
ceivers (see PH.Monitor below) that a message arrived at addr.
Protocol 2 (PH.RecvProcess(skR,pkS)). To receive a mes-
sage from sender S with public key pkS, a receiver R with
private key skR runs the following asynchronous process. Let
nr be the number of times R successfully received a message
from S. The receiver:
1. computes the Diffie-Hellman key k′ = DH(skR,pkS);
2. uses k′ to compute a random rendezvous mailbox
addr = H(‘addr’ || k′ || pkS || nr) and a symmetric key
k = H(‘key’ || k′ || pkS || nr);
3. waits until PH.Monitor (see below) receives a notification
of a new message on address addr. If no message is
posted to addr in 7 days, the process terminates;
4. opens an anonymous connection to the pigeonhole and
downloads the ciphertext c at address addr (if there was
no message due to a false positive, the process continues
at step 3); and
5. decrypts the message m′ = AE.dec(k,c) and returns the
unpadded message m or ⊥ if decryption failed.
When the receiver goes offline, this process is paused, and
resumed when the receiver comes online again.
We note that a sender may send multiple messages with-
out receiving a response. The receiver calls PH.RecvProcess
repeatedly to receive all messages (nr increases every time).
Participants keep track of the message counters ns,nr for each
pair of keys (skS,pkR) and (skR,pkS) respectively to ensure
they derive the correct addresses and decryption keys.
Protocol 3 (PH.Monitor). Journalists run the PH.Monitor pro-
cess to monitor for incoming messages. The receiver:
1. opens an anonymous monitoring connection to the pi-
geonhole and requests a list of addresses addr that re-
ceived a message since she was last online
2. via the same anonymous connection receives notifica-
tions of addresses addr with new messages.
Addresses addr received in step 1 or 2 can cause the PH.Recv-
Process processes to continue past step 3. To save bandwidth,
the pigeonhole sends a cuckoo filter [24] containing the ad-
dresses in step 1, and only the first 2 bytes of the address in
step 2 (PH.RecvProcess handles false positives).
The PH.Cover and PH.HiddenSend protocols ensure con-
versation messages are unobservable. Senders store a queue
of outgoing conversation messages for each recipient.
Protocol 4 (PH.Cover(skR)). Every journalist starts the
PH.Cover process as soon as they come online. Let skR be the
medium-term private key, and pk1, . . . ,pkn−1 be the medium-
term public keys of the other journalists. The process runs the
following concurrently:
• Cover keys. Draw an exponential delay tk← Exp(1/λk),
and wait for time tk. Generate a fresh cover key-pair
(skc,pkc) and upload pkc to the bulletin board by calling
BB.broadcast(pkc). Repeat.
• Sending messages. Wait until the first cover key pkc has
been uploaded. For each recipient pki proceed as follows:
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1. Draw ti← Exp(1/λc) and wait for time ti.
2. Let mi be the first message in the send queue for pki
or a dummy message if the queue is empty. Send
the message by calling PH.SendRaw(skc,pki,mi).
3. Repeat.
• Receiving cover messages. For each non-expired
cover key pk′c on the bulletin board call m ←
PH.RecvProcess(skR,pk′c). If m is a real message (see
Section 5.2) forward the message to DATASHARE, other-
wise discard. Repeat.
This process stops when the user goes offline, and
PH.RecvProcess processes started by PH.Cover are canceled.
Protocol 5 (PH.HiddenSend(skS,pkR,m)). To send a mes-
sage m to recipient R with public key pkR, sender S with
private key skS places m in the send queue for pkR.
4.2 Messaging service privacy
We first define what we mean by unobservable messages
and then prove that conversation messages sent using
PH.HiddenSend are unobservable.
Definition 1 (Unobservability). A conversation message is
unobservable if all PPT adversaries have a negligible advan-
tage in distinguishing a scenario in which the sender S sends a
conversation message to the receiver R, from a scenario where
S does not send a conversation message to R.
Theorem 2. Messages sent using PH.HiddenSend are unob-
servable towards any adversary who controls the communi-
cation server but does not control the sender or the receiver,
assuming the receiver awaits both conversation and cover
messages. This statement is also true when the adversary can
break the network anonymity Tor provides.
Proof. To show conversation messages are unobservable, we
must prove that the following two scenarios are indistinguish-
able: the scenario in which the sender sends a conversation
message (sent by PH.Cover after a conversation message
has been queued using PH.HiddenSend), and the scenario
in which the sender sends a cover message (sent by PH.Cover
when no conversation message has been queued). The intu-
ition behind this proof is that conversation and cover messages
are indistinguishable: (1) both are encrypted so that the ad-
versary cannot distinguish them based on content; and (2)
conversation messages replace cover messages, so they are
sent using the same schedule.
All messages go through the pigeonhole. For each message,
the adversary observes: 1) the pigeonhole address, 2) the
content, 3) the length, 4) the timestamps at which the message
was posted and retrieved, and 5) the sender and the receiver
(in a worst case scenario in which the adversary can break the
anonymity Tor provides). We show that the adversary’s views
in both scenarios are indistinguishable.
The content and pigeonhole address of messages are crypto-
graphically indistinguishable. Senders and receivers compute
rendezvous mailbox addresses using a Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change based on either the query public key and the owner’s
public key (when the message is a conversation messages)
or the sender and receiver’s cover keys (when the message is
a cover message). Since the adversary does not control the
sender or the receiver, it does not know the corresponding
private keys in either scenario. Under the decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption, the adversary cannot distinguish be-
tween mailbox addresses for conversation messages and mail-
box addresses for cover messages.
Under the same DH assumption, the adversary cannot learn
the symmetric key k which is used to encrypt the message
either. Moreover, all messages are padded to a fixed length of
mlen. Thus, the adversary cannot distinguish between the two
situations based on message content or length.
As a result, all messages sent between sender S and receiver
R are indistinguishable to the adversary on the cryptographic
layer. We now show that the post and retrieve times of the
messages are also independent of whether the message is a
cover message or a conversation message.
Sender. The “cover keys” and “sending messages” processes
of PH.Cover are by design independent of whether a conversa-
tion message should be sent or not. In the “sending messages”
process, the sender sends real or cover messages to the recipi-
ent at a constant rate λc. The send times are independent of
whether the sender’s queue for the receiver is empty or not.
Receiver. The receiver is listening to both conversation and
cover messages from the sender. Therefore, as soon as it is
notified of a new message, PH.RecvProcess will retrieve this
message. The retrieval time therefore does not depend on the
type of message.
As a corollary of the unobservability proof, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 3. The pigeonhole protects the secrecy of messages
from non-participants including the communication server.
Users of DATASHARE communicate with the communi-
cation server via Tor to hide their (network) identities from
the communication server. In particular, we require sender
anonymity to hide a querier’s identity from document owners,
and receiver anonymity to hide a document owner’s identity
from queriers. Using Tor ensures these properties even when
journalists collude with the communication server. Formally,
we define sender and receiver anonymity as follows:
Definition 2 (Sender anonymity). A communication system
provides sender anonymous if any PPT adversary has a negli-
gible advantage in guessing the sender of a message.
Definition 3 (Receiver anonymity). A communication sys-
tem provides receiver anonymous if any PPT adversary has a
negligible advantage in guessing the receiver of a message.
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Figure 4: Left: bandwidth (left axis) and latency (right axis) for running the communication system (CS) with 1000 journalist for
given rate λc. Middle: varying the number of journalists and average latency in the CS. Right: bandwidth (left axis) and latency
(right axis) for running the PIR system with 1000 journalists.
Theorem 4. Assuming that Tor provides sender and receiver
anonymity with respect to the communication server, the com-
munication system provides sender and receiver anonymity at
the network layer against adversaries who control the com-
munication server and a subset of journalists.
Proof. All messages go through the communication system
and journalists never directly connect to each other. The com-
munication system consists of the bulletin board and the pi-
geonhole and we study them separately.
Senders use a fresh Tor circuit when executing
BB.broadcast to publish an encrypted message (the query) to
the bulletin board. Sender anonymity is guaranteed by Tor.
The bulletin board broadcasts all messages to all journalists.
As these messages do not have an intended receiver, receiver
anonymity is not relevant.
Both senders and receivers use fresh Tor circuits when com-
municating with the communication servers. This ensures that
communications are unlinkable at the network layer, and the
adversary cannot identify the journalist from network artifacts.
As shown in the unobservability proof, the pigeonhole can
neither distinguish senders or receivers given addresses or
encrypted messages.
This theorem only relates to anonymity at the network layer.
We discuss anonymity at the application layer, i.e., based on
the content of messages, in Section 5.3.
Tor does not provide sender or receiver anonymity against
global passive adversaries. DATASHARE will migrate to
stronger network layer anonymity systems (e.g., the Nym
system [2], based on Loopix [45]) to obtain protection against
global passive adversaries.
4.3 Cost evaluation
We shaped the traffic based on the Poisson distribution to pro-
vide unobservability. However, such strong protection comes
at a cost [20]: Regardless of whether they have zero, one,
or many conversations, every journalist sends messages at a
rate λc to the other N journalists, λcN per day. Consequently,
every journalist also receives λcN messages a day.
Figure 4, left, illustrates the trade-off between bandwidth
overhead and latency for a given cover traffic rate. When jour-
nalists send few messages a day, the bandwidth requirements
are very low. For instance, setting λc to be 4 messages per
day requires every journalist to use 16.5 MB per day, includ-
ing the sending of notifications and the updating of cover
keys. For these messages to be unobservable, however, jour-
nalists can only exchange a few messages per day. Journalists
have to wait on average 6 hours between messages (less than
18 hours in 95% of the cases). If journalists require better
throughput they must consume more bandwidth. For example,
setting λc = 48 messages a day ensures that messages are sent
within half an hour on average (and within 90 minutes with
probability 95%). Storing messages from the last 7 days on
the pigeonhole for 1000 journalists and send rate of λc = 48
requires 390 GB which is manageable for a server.
The latency we report in Figure 4 assumes that journalists
are online. If they disconnect from the system before a mes-
sage is sent, they must, after coming online again, first upload
a new cover key, and then draw a new sample from Exp(λc)
to decide when to send their message. We propose to set the
update latency λk to λc/4, so that the initial latency is at most
25% more than the latency under normal circumstances.
For the current size of the population that will use
DATASHARE, 250 journalists (see Section 2.1), the bandwidth
can be kept reasonable at the cost of latency. However, as
journalists send cover traffic to everyone, the bandwidth cost
increases quadratically with the size of the population, see
Figure 4, center, and becomes pretty heavy after reaching
2000 journalists.
An alternative construction. If the traffic requirements be-
come too heavy for the organization members, bandwidth can
be reduced by increasing the computation cost at the pigeon-
hole server. Instead of using cover traffic to all journalists to
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hide the mailboxes that contain real messages, journalists can
retrieve messages using computational private information
retrieval (PIR) [8, 31].
In this approach, senders send cover messages at a rate λPIR,
independent of the number of journalists, to random mail-
boxes. When they have a real message, they send it instead of
a cover message. They use the same rate to retrieve messages
using PIR. The PIR hides the messages which are getting
retrieved from the pigeonhole and breaks the link between the
send and receive time. As a result, the server’s observation of
the system is independent of whether journalists send a real
message or not.
We illustrate the trade-off of this approach in Figure 4,
right, using SealPIR [8] to retrieve cover and conversation
messages. Responding to a PIR request in a scenario of 1000
journalists and send rate of 6 message per hour takes 12 sec-
onds. Therefore, we assume a server with 24 cores (approx
1300 USD/month in AWS) can handle this scenario. We see
that this approach enables the system to send conversation
messages at a higher rate and a lower cost. For example, send-
ing 6 messages per hour (144 messages a day) requires around
59 MB. However, as opposed to the Poisson cover approach
described in the previous section, this rate limits the total
number of messages per day regardless of recipient. Thus,
depending on the number of receivers journalists want to com-
municate on average, one or the other method could be more
advantageous.
5 The DATASHARE System
In this section, we present DATASHARE. DATASHARE’s de-
sign combines the multi-set private set intersection protocol
(Section 3), the privacy-preserving communication system
(Section 4), and an anonymous authentication mechanism
to enable asynchronous decentralized peer-to-peer document
searching.
5.1 Preliminaries
Processing documents. The primary interests of investiga-
tive journalists are named entities, such as people, locations,
and organizations (see Section 2.1). ICIJ has already devel-
oped a tool [1] which uses natural language processing to
extract named entities from documents. After the extraction,
the tool transforms named entities into a canonical form to
reduce the impact of spelling variation in names. We employ
this tool to canonicalize queries too. An advantage of using
this tool over simply listing all words in a document is that it
reduces the number of keywords per document: the majority
of documents have less than 100 named entities.
Search. DATASHARE uses the MS-PSI protocol as a pairwise
search primitive between journalists. The querier acts as MS-
PSI client, and the client’s set represents the querier’s search
keywords. The document owners act as MS-PSI servers,
where the server’s N sets represent the keywords in each of
the owner’s N documents. Therefore, each document owner
has a different corpus and secret key. Matching documents
correspond to documents that contain all query keywords
(i.e., the conjunction of the query keywords, see Section 2.1).
MS-PSI speeds up the computation and reduces the commu-
nication cost by a factor of N compared to the naive approach
of running one PSI per document.
Authenticating journalists. Only authorized journalists such
as members of the organization or collaborators are allowed to
make queries and send conversation messages. DATASHARE’s
authentication mechanism operates in epochs for which jour-
nalists obtain a limited number of anonymous tokens. Tokens
can only be used once, rate-limiting the number of queries
that journalists can make per epoch. This ensures that com-
promised journalists can extract limited information from
the system by making search queries. We considered using
identity-escrow mechanisms to mitigate damage by misbehav-
ing journalists. However, in agreement with the organization,
we decided against this approach since such mechanisms
could too easily be abused to identify honest journalists.
Recall from Section 2.1 that journalists trust the organiza-
tion as an authority for membership, and already have means
to authenticate themselves to the organization. Therefore, the
organization is the natural choice to issue anonymous tokens.
We note that, even if the organization is compromised, it can
do limited damage as it cannot link queries nor conversa-
tions to journalists (because of token anonymity). However,
it can ignore the rate-limit, enabling malicious queriers to
extract more information than allowed. To mitigate this risk,
DATASHARE could also work with several token issuers and
require a threshold of valid tokens.
For the epoch duration, the organization proposes one
month to provide a good balance between protection and
ease of key management. Rate-limits are flexible. The organi-
zation can decide to provide additional one-time-use tokens
to journalists that can motivate their need. While this reveals
to the organization which journalists are more active, it does
not reveal what they use the tokens for.
Instantiation. Tokens take the form of a blind signature on
an ephemeral signing key. We use Abe’s blind signature (BS)
scheme [6]. The organization runs BS.Setup(1`) to generate a
signing key msk and a public verification key mpk. To sign an
ephemeral key pkT , the journalist and the organization jointly
run the BS.Sign() protocol. The user takes as private input
the key pkT , and the organization takes as private input its
signing key msk. The user obtains a signature C on pkT . The
verification algorithm BS.Verify(mpk,C,pkT ) returns > if C
is a valid for pkT and ⊥ otherwise. These blind signatures
are anonymous: the blindness property of BS ensures that
the signer cannot link the signature C or the key pkT to the
journalist that ran the corresponding signing protocol.
Let skT be the private key corresponding to pkT . We call
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T = (skT ,C) an authentication token. The organization re-
quires journalists to authenticate themselves before issuing
a query or sending a message. To authenticate, journalists
create a signature σ on the message using skT , and append
the signature σ and blind signature C on pkT .
Anonymous authentication with rate-limiting could alter-
natively have been instantiated with n-times anonymous cre-
dentials [14]; single show anonymous credentials [11, 13]; or
regular anonymous credentials [10,46] made single-show. We
opted for the simplest approach.
Cuckoo filter. DATASHARE uses cuckoo filters [24] to rep-
resent tag collections in a space-efficient manner. The space
efficiency comes at the price of having false positives when
answering membership queries. The false negative ratio is
always zero. The false positive ratio is a parameter chosen
when instantiating the filter. Depending on the configuration,
a cuckoo filter can compress a set to less than 2 bytes per
element regardless of the elements’ original size.
Users call CF.compress(S,params) to compute a cuckoo
filter CF of the input set S using the parameters specified
in params. Then, CF.membership(CF,x) returns > if x was
added to the cuckoo filter, and ⊥ otherwise. For convenience,
we write CF.intersection(CF,S′) to compute the intersection
S′ ∩ S with the elements S contained in the cuckoo filter.
The function CF.intersection can be implemented by running
CF.membership on each element of S′.
5.2 DATASHARE protocols and design
The journalists’ organization sets up the DATASHARE system
by running SystemSetup (Protocol 6). Thereafter, journalists
join DATASHARE by running JournalistSetup (Protocol 7).
Journalists periodically call GetToken (Protocol 8) to get new
authentication tokens, and Publish (Protocol 9) to make their
documents searchable. DATASHARE does not support multi-
devices and the software running on journalists’ machines
automatically handles key management without requiring hu-
man interaction. If a journalist’s key is compromised, she
contacts the organization to revoke it. Figure 5 shows how
these protocols are integrated into DATASHARE.
Protocol 6 (SystemSetup). The journalist organization runs
SystemSetup to set up the DATASHARE system:
1. The organization generates a cyclic group G of prime
order p with generator g, hash functions H : {0,1}∗→
{0,1}` and Hˆ : {0,1}∗→G for use in the MS-PSI pro-
tocols. It selects parameters params for the cuckoo filter
and sets the maximum number of query keywords lim
(we use lim= 10). The organization publishes these.
2. The organization sets up a token issuer by running
(msk,mpk) = BS.Setup(1`) and publishes mpk.
3. The organization sets up a communication server, which
provides a bulletin board and a pigeonhole.
Protocol 7 (JournalistSetup). Journalists run JournalistSetup
to join the network:
1. The journalist authenticates to the organization and reg-
isters for DATASHARE.
Protocol 8 (GetToken). Journalists run GetToken to obtain
one-time-use authentication tokens from the organization.
1. The journalist J connects to the organization and authen-
ticates herself. The organization verifies that J is allowed
to obtain an extra token, and aborts if not.
2. The journalist generates an ephemeral signing key
(skT ,pkT ); runs the BS.Sign() protocol with the orga-
nization to obtain the organization’s signature C on the
message pkT (without the organization learning pkT );
and stores the token T = (skT ,C).
At the beginning of each epoch, journalists repeatedly run
the GetToken protocol to obtain tokens for the new epoch.
Protocol 9 (Publish). Journalists run Publish to make their
documents searchable. It takes as input a token T = (skT ,C)
and a set Docs= {d1, ..,dN} of N documents such that each
document di is a set of keywords in {0,1}∗. This protocol
includes the pre-computation phase of MS-PSI.
1. The journalist chooses a secret key s←$ Zp and com-
putes her tag collection for the MS-PSI protocol as
TC= {H(i || Hˆ(y)s) | i ∈ [N], y ∈ di},
and compresses it into a cuckoo filter CF =
CF.compress(TC,params).
2. The journalist generates a long-term pseudonym nym,
and a medium-term contact key pair (sk,pk).
3. The journalist encodes her pseudonym nym, public key
pk, compressed tag collection CF, and the number of
documents N as her public record
Rec= (nym,pk,CF,N).
4. The journalist signs her record σ= Sign(skT ,Rec) and
runs BB.broadcast(Rec || σ || pkT ||C) to publish it.
DATASHARE automatically rotates (e.g., every week) the
medium-term contact key of journalists (sk,pk) to ensure
forward secrecy. This prevents that an attacker that obtains
a journalist’s medium-term private key can recompute the
mailbox addresses and encryption key of messages sent and
received by the compromised journalist.
Journalists retrieve all public records from the bulletin
board. They run Verify(pkT ,σ,Rec) to verify the records
against the ephemeral signing key, run BS.Verify(pkT ,C,mpk)
to validate the blind signature, and check that they have not
seen pkT before. Journalists discard invalid records.
DATASHARE incorporates MS-PSI into its protocols to en-
able the search. Querying works as follows (Fig. 5): (1) The
querier posts a query together with a fresh key pkq to the bul-
letin board (Protocol 10); (2) Document owners retrieve these
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Figure 5: An overview of DATASHARE protocols.
queries from the bulletin board (2a), they compute the reply
address, and they send the reply to a pigeonhole mailbox (2b,
see Protocol 11); (3) The querier monitors the reply addresses
for all document owners, retrieves the replies, and computes
the intersection to determine matches (Protocol 12).
Protocol 10 (Query). Queriers run Query to search for key-
words X . The protocol takes as input a token T = (skT ,C).
1. The querier generates a key pair (skq,pkq) for the query
and pads X to lim keywords by adding random elements.
2. As in the MS-PSI protocol, the querier picks a fresh
blinding factor c←$ Zp, and computes:
Q = {Hˆ(x)c | x ∈ X}.
3. The journalist signs the query Q and its public key pkq as
σ=Sign(skT ,Q || pkq), and broadcasts the query Q, pub-
lic key pkq, signature σ, ephemeral token key pkT , and to-
ken C by running BB.broadcast(Q || pkq || σ || pkT ||C).
Recall that MS-PSI perfectly hides the keywords inside
queries, so they can be safely broadcasted.
Protocol 11 (Reply). Document owners run Reply to answer
a query (Q,pkq,σ,pkT ,C) retrieved from the bulletin board.
1. The owner verifies the query by checking Verify(pkT ,σ,
Q || pkq),BS.Verify(mpk,C,pkq), and that she did not see
pkT before. If any verification fails, she aborts.
2. The owner uses her secret key s to compute the MS-PSI
response R = {xs | x ∈ Q} to the query.
3. Let sk be the owner’s medium-term private key. She runs
PH.SendRaw(sk,pkq,R) to post the result to the pigeon-
hole, and starts the process PH.RecvProcess(sk,pkq) to
await conversation messages from the querier (see Con-
verse below).
Protocol 12 (Process). Queriers run the Process protocol
for every journalist J with record Rec= (nym,pk,CF,N) to
retrieve and process responses to their query (Q,skq,c).
1. The querier runs the asynchronous protocol R ←
PH.RecvProcess(skq,pk) to get the new response.
2. Similar to MS-PSI, the querier computes the size of the
intersection Ii for each document di, 1≤ i≤ N, as
Ii =
∣∣∣CF.intersection(CF,{H(i ‖ xc−1) | x ∈ R})∣∣∣ .
3. Let q = |Q|. The querier learns that the owner nym has
t = |{i | Ii = q}| matching documents.
After finding a match the querier and owner can converse
via the pigeonhole to discuss the sharing of documents using
the Converse protocol.
Protocol 13 (Converse). Let (skq,pkq) be the query’s key-
pair, and (skO,pkO) the owner’s medium-term keypair at the
time of sending the query.
• The querier sends messages m to the owner by calling
PH.HiddenSend(skq,pkO,m), and awaits replies by call-
ing PH.RecvProcess(skq,pkO).
• The owner sends messages m to the querier by calling
PH.HiddenSend(skO,pkq,m), and awaits replies by call-
ing PH.RecvProcess(skO,pkq).
• After receiving a message, the receiving party calls
PH.RecvProcess again, to await further messages.
Querier and owner know they communicate with legitimate
journalists: Both the query’s key pkq and the owner’s key pkO
are signed using a one-time-use token.
5.3 DATASHARE security analysis
DATASHARE provides the following guarantees:
Protecting queries. The requirements state (see Section 2.1)
that DATASHARE must protect the searched keywords and
identity of the querier from adversaries that control the com-
munication server and a subset of document owners. The
Query protocol, which handles sending queries, is based on
MS-PSI. DATASHARE represents searched keywords as the
client’s set in MS-PSI. Theorem 1 states that MS-PSI per-
fectly hides the client’s set from malicious servers. Therefore,
DATASHARE protects the content of queries from document
owners.
DATASHARE does not reveal any information about the
identity of queriers at the network and application layer. The-
orem 4 shows that the communication system provides sender
and receiver anonymity and protects the querier’s identity at
the network layer. At the application layer, the querier sends
(Q || pkq || σ || pkT || C) as part of the Query protocol to
the bulletin board. The values σ, pkT , and C form an anony-
mous authentication token based on Abe’s blind signature [6].
Anonymous tokens are independent of the querier’s identity.
The value pkq is an ephemeral public key, and Q is a MS-PSI
query which uses an ephemeral secret for the client. Hence,
both pkq and Q are independent of the querier’s identity too.
Therefore, the content of the query does not leak querier’s
identity at the application layer.
11
Protecting conversations. The requirements state (see Sec-
tion 2.1) that DATASHARE must protect 1) the content and
2) the identity of participants of a conversation from non-
participants. Moreover, DATASHARE must protect 3) the iden-
tity of journalists in a conversation from each other.
First, Theorem 3 proves the secrecy of the communication
system and enforces that only the sender and receiver can read
their messages. Therefore, adversaries who do not control a
participant cannot read the conversation message m in the
Converse protocol.
Second, Theorem 2 proves that communication is unob-
servable as long as participants are awaiting both conversation
and cover messages. DATASHARE enforces this requirement
by construction. Immediately after answering a query (see
Reply, Protocol 11), the owner starts a PH.RecvProcess to
listen for messages from the querier. Similarly, the querier
starts to listen for conversation messages from the owner right
after sending him a conversation message (see Converse,
Protocol 13). Moreover, “cover keys” and “receiving cover
messages” in the PH.Cover protocol ensures that all journal-
ists broadcast their cover keys and start PH.RecvProcess after
receiving a new cover key. Therefore, DATASHARE satisfies
the requirements on the communication systems in Theorem 2
and thus provides unobservability.
Finally, DATASHARE aims to hide the identity of journalists
from their counterparts in a conversation. Theorem 4 shows
that the communication system does not reveal the identity
of journalists at the network layer. DATASHARE also ensures
protection at the cryptographic layer. Queries are unlinkable
because queriers use an ephemeral public key pkq, and docu-
ment owners are pseudonymous (identified by their public key
pkO). However, DATASHARE cannot provide unconditional
protection for conversations. Queriers or document owner
could identify themselves as part of the conversation. More-
over, by their very nature, messages in a conversation are
linkable. Finally, as we discuss below, insiders can use extra
information to identify communication partners.
Protecting document collections. Any functional search sys-
tem inherently reveals information about the documents that it
makes available for search: To be useful it must return at least
one bit of information. An attacker can learn more information
by making additional queries. We show that DATASHARE pro-
vides comparable document owner’s privacy to that of ideal
theoretical search systems. We use as a security metric the
number of queries an attacker has to make to achieve each of
the following goals:
Document recovery. Given a target set of keywords of arbitrary
length (e.g. “XKeyscore” and “Snowden”), an adversary aims
to learn which keywords from the target set are contained in
a document for which some keywords are already known.
Corpus extraction. Given a set of target keywords, an adver-
sary aims at knowing which documents in a corpus contain
which target keywords. If the target set contains all possible
keywords, the adversary effectively recovers the full corpus.
Table 3: Privacy and scalability of the hypothetical and
DATASHARE’s MS-PSI based search protocols. Number of
necessary queries to achieve document recovery and corpus
extraction when interacting with a corpus of d documents
over a set n keywords. The document extraction bound for
the 1-bit system extracts up to uniqueness bound u.
Doc Extract Scale
1-bit n nu+nd - -
#doc n nd -
DATASHARE n/lim n/lim +
Any functional search system is also susceptible to
confirmation attacks. An adversary interested in knowing
whether a document in a collection contains a keyword (e.g.,
“XKeyscore” to learn whether the collection contains the
Snowden documents) can always directly query for the key-
word of interest.
We compare the number of queries an adversary needs to
extract the corpus or recover a document in DATASHARE to
the number of queries required in two hypothetical systems.
First, an ideal search system in which given a query the querier
learns only one bit of information: whether the owner has
a matching document. Second, a search system where the
querier learns how many matching documents the owner has.
Table 3 compares these hypothetical systems with
DATASHARE’s use of MS-PSI, where d is the number of
documents and n the number of relevant keywords. In Appen-
dices B.1 and B.2 we show that extracting all the keywords
from a document requires at most n queries in the 1-bit and
#docs search systems.
Extracting the full corpus using the one-bit search system
is not always possible. Define the uniqueness number uD to
be the smallest number of keywords that uniquely identify a
document D. If D is a strict subset of another document D′,
the document cannot be uniquely identified and we set uD =
∞. However, since corpora are small, we expect that most
documents can be identified by a few well-chosen keywords,
resulting in small uniqueness numbers.
In Appendix B.1 we show that extracting all documents
with uniqueness number less or equal to u takes O(nu+nd)
queries in the 1-bit search system. In Appendix B.2 we show
that extracting all documents (regardless of uniqueness num-
ber) takes O(nd) queries in the #doc search system.
In DATASHARE, we limit MS-PSI queries to lim keywords
per query. Therefore, any document extraction attack must
make at least n/lim queries to ensure all keywords are queried
at least once. In fact, this bound is tight for both document
recovery and corpus extraction in MS-PSI as one can simply
compute the intersection with all keywords.
In summary, DATASHARE offers similar protection against
corpus extraction as the #doc ideal system. For document
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recovery, not even the ideal one-bit-search system offers much
better protection. At the same time, MS-PSI is much more
efficient than their ideal counterparts.
Internal Adversaries. An adversary may use auxiliary in-
formation about a journalist’s behavior or corpus to gain an
advantage in identifying the journalist. Some of these attacks
are inherent to all systems which provide search or messaging
capability. These attacks, however, do not allow the adversary
to extract additional information from journalists’ corpora.
Intersection attacks. A malicious sender (respectively, re-
ceiver) who has access to the online/offline status of jour-
nalists can use this information to reduce the anonymity set
of the receiver (respectively, sender) to only those users that
are online. As more messages are exchanged, this anonymity
set becomes unavoidably smaller [29]. This attack is inherent
to all low-delay asynchronous messaging systems, including
the one provided by the communication server. In the con-
text of DATASHARE we note that once document owners and
queriers are having a conversation, it is likely that they re-
veal their identity to each other. Yet, we stress that preserving
anonymity and, in general, minimizing the digital traces left
by the journalists in the system is very important to reduce the
risk that journalists become profitable targets for subpoenas
or hacking attempts.
Stylometry. A malicious receiver can use stylometry, i.e., lin-
guistic style, to guess the identity of the sender of a message.
The effectiveness of this attack depends on the volume of
conversation [33, 38]. This attack is inherent to all messaging
systems, as revealing the content of the messages is required
to provide utility.
Partial knowledge of corpus. Adversaries who have prior
knowledge about a journalist’s corpus can use this knowledge
to identify this journalist in the system. However, due to MS-
PSI’s privacy property (see Theorem 1), learning more about
the documents in that journalist’s corpus requires making
search queries.
If an adversary convinces a journalist to add a document
with a unique keyword pattern to his corpus, then the adver-
sary can detect this journalist’s corpus by searching for the
pattern. DATASHARE cannot prevent such out of band water-
marking. However, the adversary still needs to make further
queries to learn anything about non-watermarked documents.
Non-goals. Finally, we discuss security properties that are
not required in DATASHARE.
Query unlinkability. DATASHARE does not necessarily hide
which queries are made by the same querier. Even though
anonymity is ensured at the network and application layers,
queriers that have made multiple queries may retrieve re-
sponses for all these queries in quick succession after coming
online. Document owners know the corresponding query of
their messages, and if they collude with the communication
server, then they can infer that the same person made these
queries. As no adversary can learn any information about the
queries themselves, we consider this leakage to be irrelevant.
Owner unlinkability. DATASHARE also reveals which
pseudonymous document owner created a MS-PSI response,
making responses linkable. DATASHARE cannot provide un-
linkability for document owners when using MS-PSI. While
MS-PSI itself could be modified to work without knowing
the document owner’s pseudonym, an adversary could simply
repeat a specific rare keyword (for example, “one-word-to-
link-them-all”), and identify document owners based on the
corresponding pretag they produce. We believe that revealing
the document owner’s pseudonym is an acceptable leakage
for the performance gain it provides.
5.4 Cost Evaluation
At the time of writing, the journalist’s organization has
implemented the local search and indexing component of
DATASHARE [1]. We have also implemented a Python proto-
type of the cryptographic building blocks underlying search
(Section 3) and authentication (Section 5.1). The messaging
service (Section 4) relies on standard cryptographic opera-
tions so we have not implemented any prototype.
We are currently running a user study among the organiza-
tion members to agree on the final configuration of the system.
The goal is to familiarize journalists with a kind of search and
messaging that is different than those they typically use in
their daily activities (Google and email or instant messaging,
respectively); as well as with the threat model within which
DATASHARE provides protection. We recall that DATASHARE
hides all key management and cryptography from the users,
thus we do not study those aspects.
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the cryp-
tographic operations involved in search and authentication.
Our prototype uses the petlib [19] binding to OpenSSL on the
fast NIST P-256 curve for the elliptic curve cryptography in
MS-PSI. We implement the Cuckoo filter using cuckoopy [7].
We ran all experiments on an Intel i3-8100 processor running
at 3.60GHz using a single core. We note that operations could
be easily parallelized to improve performance.
We focus our evaluation on the computational cost and
bandwidth cost of the authentication and search primitives
to ensure that DATASHARE fulfills the requirements in Sec-
tion 2.1 without journalists needing fast hardware or fast
connections. When reporting bandwidth cost we omit the
overhead of the meta-protocol that carries messages between
system parties. We do not consider any one-time setup cost,
nor the standard cryptography used for messaging. We also
do not measure network delay as the latency the Tor network
introduces – around 1 second [4] – is negligible compared to
the waiting time imposed by connection asynchrony; and it
is orders of magnitude less than the journalists waiting limits
(see Section 2.1).
We provide performance measurements for different sys-
tem work loads. We consider the base scenario to be 1000
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Figure 6: Time (left axis) and bandwidth (right axis, unpadded) for single query on one journalist (left), single query on all
journalists (center), answering several queries (right).
journalists, each of whom makes 1000 documents available
for search. There is no requirement for the number of key-
words per document or keywords per query. As a conservative
estimate, we assume that each document contains 100 key-
words, and that each query contains 10 keywords.
Authenticating journalists. We implement the BS scheme
using anonymous credentials light (ACL) [11]. Running
BS.Sign requires transfering 367 bytes and takes 1.44 ms
and 2.1 ms respectively for the organization and the journal-
ist. Each blind signature is 335 bytes and verifying it using
BS.Verify takes 0.87 ms. We include these costs in the respec-
tive protocols.
Publishing documents. Data owners run Publish to make
their documents available. For the base scenario, this one-
time operation takes 14 seconds, and results in a cuckoo filter
of size 400 KB for a FPR of 0.004%. As a conservative estima-
tion we assume all keywords are different. When documents
contain duplicate elements y the precomputation can be amor-
tized: the pretag ys has to be computed only once.
Querying a single journalist. Figure 6, left, shows the time
and bandwidth required to issue one query on one collection
depending on the collection size. The querier constructs the
query using Query and sends it to the document owner (the
querier’s computation cost includes the cost of obtaining the
one-time-use token using GetToken). The document owner
responds using Reply. These operations are independent of the
number of documents. The querier runs Process to retrieve
the responses, and to compute the intersection of query and
collection. This takes 27 ms in the base scenario. Bandwidth
cost reflects the raw content size, they are then padded to
1 KB.
Querying all journalists. As expected, the processing time
and bandwidth of Query are independent of the population
size, while the cost of processing the responses grows lin-
early with the number of queried journalists (Figure 6, center).
For the baseline scenario, processing all 999 responses takes
about 27 seconds in total and requires retrieving 1 MB of
padded responses. We note that this cost is only paid by the
Figure 7: Communication cost for different communication
strategies, depending on the number of journalists. We assume
1 query per journalist per day in the search component.
querier, and does not impact the document owners (see be-
low). Moreover, since replies are unlikely to arrive all at once,
processing can be spread out over time reducing the burden
on the querier’s machine.
This computation assumes that each journalist has the same
number of documents. In practice, this may not hold. How-
ever, as we see in Figure 6, left, as soon as collections have
more than 50 documents the computation time grows linearly
with the collection size. Thus, as long as journalists have
collections with at least 50 documents, the measurements in
Figure 6, center, are largely independent of how these docu-
ments are distributed among journalists.
The cost for document owners. Document owners also
spend time and bandwidth to answer queries by other jour-
nalists. Figure 6, right, shows how these costs depend on the
total number of queries an owner receives per day. Even when
all journalists make 10 queries of 10 keywords each day (un-
likely in practice) the total computation time for document
owners is less than 20 seconds, and they send and receive less
than 7 megabytes (10 MB when padded).
Overall cost of DATASHARE. Finally, we plot in Figure 7 the
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total bandwith a journalist needs per day to run DATASHARE
depending on the number of journalists in the system and the
strategy implemented by the communication system. Regard-
less of the size of the system, the cost associated to hide com-
munications dominates the cost stemming from searches. Re-
garding the communication cost, as explained in Section 4.3,
for small organizations Poisson-rate cover traffic provides a
better trade-off with respect to throughput, but as more journal-
ists join the system, the PIR-based system starts performing
better.
6 Related work
Many PSI protocols [18,27,30,39] differ from De Christofaro
et al.’s [17] only in how they instantiate the oblivious pseudo-
random functions (OPRFs). Our MS-PSI protocols can easily
be adjusted to use alternative OPRFs to compute the pretags.
However, since, bandwidth is at a premium in our scenario,
we base our MS-PSI protocols on De Christofaro et al. [17],
as their scheme has the lowest communication cost.
The restrictions on computational power and bandwidth
rule out many other PSI schemes. Protocols based on oblivi-
ous polynomial evaluation [25] have very high computational
cost. Hash-based PSI protocols [42–44] have low computa-
tional cost, but instead require a lot of communication. Finally,
PSI protocols can be build from generic secure multi-party
computation directly [28,41,42]. However, this approach also
suffers from a high communication cost and requires more
than one communication round.
Secure multi-party computation based PSI protocols can
be extended to provide better privacy than MS-PSI: The un-
derlying circuits can be extended to implement either the
ideal 1-bit search or the #doc search system. However, their
high communication and round complexity rules out their use
in our document search system. Recently, Zhao and Chow
proposed a threshold PSI protocol based on polynomial eval-
uation [52] that can implement the #doc search system (by
setting the threshold equal to the number of keywords). But
its communication and computation complexity rule it out.
Document search could also be implemented using private
information retrieval (PIR): Queriers use PIR to privately
query keywords in the document owner’s database. Computa-
tional PIR protocols [8, 31, 37] (IT-PIR protocols [12, 26]
do not apply) place a high computational burden on the
database owner. Moreover, PIR requires a fixed set of key-
words, which we cannot assume exists. Keyword-based PIR
approaches [9,16] sidestep this issue, but instead require mul-
tiple communication rounds. Therefore, PIR does not apply.
Encrypted databases hide the queries of data owners
from an untrusted database server [22, 40, 47, 49]. While
DATASHARE could operate such a central encrypted database,
any collusion between a journalist and the database server
would leak the entire database. Document owners also cannot
operate an encrypted database themselves, as these systems
are not designed to provide query privacy against a database
server that colludes with the data owner (i.e., the document
owner).
7 Future steps: better protection for
DATASHARE
We have introduced DATASHARE, a decentralized privacy-
preserving search engine that enables journalists to find and
request information held by their peers. DATASHARE has
great potential to help journalists collaborate to uncover cross-
border crimes, corruption, or abuse of power.
Our collaboration with a large organization of investigative
journalists provided us with a novel set of requirements that,
despite being deeply grounded in practicality, are rarely con-
sidered in academic publications. These requirements forced
us to design new building blocks that we optimized for differ-
ent security trade-offs than previous work. We combined these
building blocks into an efficient and low-risk decentralized
search system.
Yet, DATASHARE’s protections are not perfect. Both the
search primitive, and the availability of timestamps of actions
in the system, leak information. At the time of writing, the
high cost in bandwidth and/or computation of state-of-the-art
techniques that could prevent this leakage – e.g., PIR to hide
access patterns and efficient garbled circuits to implement
one-bit search – precludes their deployment.
We hope that this paper fosters new research that addresses
these problems. We believe that the new set of requirements
opens an interesting new design space with lots of potential
to produce results that have high impact, not only by helping
investigative journalism to support democratic societies, but
also in other domains.
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A Security of MS-PSI
In this section, we prove MS-PSI’s privacy. The client’s inter-
action with the server is identical to PSI [17] and C-PSI [30]
protocols. Hence, we argue that they have the same privacy.
We use the ideal/real world paradigm in the random oracle
model to show that the MS-PSI client does not learn anything
beyond the intended output of the protocol.
In the MS-PSI protocol, the number of queried keywords
q determines how much information is revealed, rather than
the number of queries in which these q keywords are asked.
Hence, instead of counting the number of PSI queries we mea-
sure the client’s interaction by keywords queried. We assume
a non-uniform adversary since the protocol reveals the size
of each party’s set. The protocol is interactive; the client asks
keywords in multiple queries and receives the response of
i’th query before asking i+1’th one. We assume an adaptive
adversary in which the adversary asks her keywords one by
one and receives responses immediately. The non-adaptive
versions or versions where the client queries multiple key-
words simultaneously only delay when the adversary receives
the response. Hence, they have the same security guarantee
as the adaptive version.
An adaptive PSI functionality. Let λ be an empty string, w
be the client’s input keyword, and Y = [Y1, . . . ,Yn] be a list of
n server keyword sets Yi = {yi,1, . . . ,yi,ni}. We define adaptive
PSI functionality PSIadt as a two party function in which the
client learns the sets which contain the keyword w, and the
server learns nothing:
PSIadt(w,Y ) = ({i|i ∈ [n]∧w ∈ Yi)},λ).
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We define Ideal f ,q as ideal incorporation of PSI in which a
trusted third party receives the server’s input and responds to
the client’s PSIadt queries at most q times. If required, Ideal f ,q
can answer non-adaptive queries with t keywords by calling
PSIadt process t times and concatenating their responses. It’s
important to note that this operation costs t adaptive queries.
We define the real world Realmspsi,q as running the MS-PSI
protocol and allowing the client to ask up to q queries.
The MS-PSI protocol consists of 2 parts: 1) publish: which
corresponds to the pre-process phase (Protocol 9) and 2) ex-
ponentiation: which corresponds to the online interaction
(Protocols 10 and 12). MS-PSI uses two hash-functions H
and Hˆ, which are modeled in the random oracle model (ROM).
We define following oracles to represent the MS-PSI scheme.
x← ORealHG (w) hashes the keyword w into a uniformly random
group element x ∈R G.
TC← ORealPub () performs the publish protocol 9, i.e. choses
the server’s secret key α, and publishes server’s tag col-
lection TC which consists of N = ∑ni=1 ni tags with uni-
formly random distribution.
xα← ORealexp (x) takes a group element x and exponentiates it
with α and returns xα. The adversary is limited to asking
up to q queries.
tg← ORealHkw (s) hashes input s to a random l-bit tag tg.
We assume a PPT adversary A which interacts with
Realmspsi,q. We design a simulator S which extract the same
information from the Ideal world given black-box access to A .
Since MS-PSI’s output is deterministic and we have proven it
correct, we only need to show that the view of A in real and
ideal worlds are indistinguishable.
RealAmspsi,q([wi|i ∈ [q]],Y ,N)
c≡ IdealS(A)f ,q ([wi|i ∈ [q]],Y ,N)
We start with a high-level overview of the proof. The sim-
ulator S uses MS-PSI’s publish and exponentiation with a
random secret key, which is identical to the real world. How-
ever, S has to extract the adversary’s effective input to query
the ideal oracle and respond. The key idea is that the adver-
sary needs to query every keyword from the oracle OHkw to
compute its tag and the intersection. The simulator uses OHkw
and the server’s secret α to decrypt client’s query xα and
extract the input x. After extracting A’s input, S can query
the ideal oracle and respond accordingly. We show that S is
indistinguishable from the real world.
If the simulator S ask more than q ideal queries Ideal, the
simulation fails. We show that the probability of failure is neg-
ligible. The failure happens when an adversary asks q+1’th
valid OHkw query without querying Oexp more than q times.
Informally, this means that the adversary can compute the ex-
ponentiation rαi of q+1 random values ri with only q queries
to the exponentiation oracle, which translates into the One-
more-Gap-DH problem.
Proof. We build the simulator S as follow:
x← OSHG(w) responds the same way as ORealHG and stores the
mapping between each keyword and its matching group
element (w,x) :∈ ({0,1}∗,G).
TC← OSPub() choses a random key α and publishes N uni-
formly random l-bit tags TC to represent the tag col-
lection. The adversary is non-uniform, so the simulator
receives N, which is TC’s size, as part of its input.
xα← OSexp(x) same as ORealexp . The adversary is limited to ask-
ing up to q queries.
tg← OSHkw(s) the oracle remembers every query to respond
to repeated queries consistently. The protocol expects to
receives inputs in the form of s = “id||z” = “id||xα” and
proceeds as follows.
1. If the input does not have a “id||z” form, respond
with a random l-bit tag tg.
2. Use the secret key to compute A’s input element
x = zα
−1
from s.
3. If element x is not queried from OSHG respond with
a random l-bit tag tg.
4. Retrieve x’s keyword w from OSHG’s mapping
(w,x).
5. If S has not asked w from the ideal oracle and
already asked q queries from Ideal, then fail.
6. If S has not asked w from the ideal oracle, ask and
store the response as f [w] = Ideal(w,Y ).
7. If id ∈ f [w], respond with an unused tag tg ∈ TC.
Otherwise, respond with a random l-bit tag tg.
Oracles ORealexp and OSexp are identical, and it is easy to see
that OSHG and O
S
Pub are indistinguishable from their Real coun-
terpart.
Now we show that as long as S does not fail, ORealHkw and
OSHkw are indistinguishable. Both oracles claim to respond to
a query representing (w, id) with a tag tg ∈ TC for w ∈ Yid
and with a uniformly random l-bit tag for w /∈ Yid . Therefore,
these two oracles are indistinguishable if they are correct.
We have already proved that MS-PSI is correct, so we only
need to show that S is correct. The oracle OSHkw responds
positively to the query (w, id) if and only if the input is in
form of s = “id||OHG(w)α” and the document identifier is in
the ideal response id ∈ Ideal(w,Y ) =⇒ w ∈ Yid . We show
that probability of false-positive and true-negative in OSHkw is
negligible to prove the correctness. We name the number of
queries to oracles OSHG and O
S
Hkw
as QG and Qkw, respectively.
A false-positive happens when there is collision between
adversary’s input z to the oracle OSHkw and one of keyword
queried from y← OSHG(w′), z = yα. This event has a probabil-
ity of QG.Qkw/Ord(G) which is negligible. A false-negative
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can only happen if OSHG(w) is not known at the time of the
query. The probability of OSHG(w) matching to one of previous
OSHkw(s) queries is QG.Qkw/Ord(G) which is negligible.
The simulator S fails when the adversary asks q+1 queries
representing q+ 1 different keywords from OSHkw while re-
specting OSexp’s at most q queries restriction. We assume that
A triggers a failure with probability ε. Now we define One-
more-Gap-DH assumption and relate it to the failure probabil-
ity ε.
One-more-Gap-DH assumption informally states that com-
puting CDH is hard even if the adversary has access to a CDH
oracle and DDH problem is easy.
The adversary A gets access to a CDH oracle xα ←
OCDH(x) and an DLα oracle 1/0← ODLα(x,z) which deter-
mines whether a pair of elements x,z ∈G are a DH pair with
oracle’s secret z = xα. The DLα oracle is a weaker form of
DDH assumption since ODLα(x,z) = DDH(h,h
α,x,z).
The One-more-Gap-DH assumption states that the adver-
sary has negligible chance in producing q+1 DH pairs (xi,xαi )
from M random challenge elements Ch = (c1, ..,cM) while
asking at most q queries from the CDH oracle OCDH .
Pr[{(xi,xαi )|xi ∈Ch}i∈[q+1]← AOCDH (.),ODLα (.,.)(Ch)]< µ
If A has a non-negligible chance of creating failures in
simulator S , an adversary B exists which has non-negligible
advantage in solving One-more-Gap-DH problem.
The simulator S has two main functionality: computing
exponentiation with a secret key inOSexp and finding the match-
ing input element x = zα
−1
in the OSHkw . We build adversary
B by replacing the secret key α in the simulator S with a
One-more-Gap-DH challenge and interacting with A in a
black-box manner. The adversary B uses OBHG to fix input
elements to challenge points and uses the CDH oracle OCDH
for responding to OBexp queries. Finally, B uses ODLα to detect
which challenge point matches z in OBHkw’s query. Receiving
q+1 queries from OBHkw with different keywords corresponds
to having q+1 DH pair from the challenge set without asking
more than q queries from OCDH .
Proof. We build the adversary B as follows:
x← OBHG(w) responds with a new challenge element x ∈Ch
and stores the mapping between each keyword and its
matching group element (w,x) ∈ ({0,1}∗,Ch⊂R G).
TC← OBPub() since OCDH has its own secret α the OBPub does
not need to chose another secret, but it publishes TC in
the same manner as OSPub.
xα← OBexp(x) uses OCDH(x) to response to up to q queries.
tg← OSHkw(s) is similar to OSHkw . the oracle remembers ev-
ery query to respond to repeated queries consistently.
The protocol expects to receives inputs in the form of
s = “id||z” = “id||xα”. Unlike, OSHkw this oracle does not
know the secret α to decrypt the input element. Instead, it
uses ODLα to check z against all challenge points xi ∈Ch
and find the corresponding element 1 = ODLα(xi,z) =⇒
z = xαi .
1. If the input does not have a “id||z” form, respond
with a random l-bit tag tg.
2. Find challenge point x ∈Ch where 1 = ODLα(x,z).
3. Since Range(OBHG)⊂Ch, if there is no such point
in Ch then x = zα
−1
does not have a correspond-
ing query in OBHG , and the oracle responds with a
random l-bit tag tg.
4. Retrieve x’s keyword w from OSHG’s mapping
(w,x).
5. If S has not asked w from the ideal oracle and
already asked q queries from Ideal, then fail.
6. If S has not asked w from the ideal oracle, ask and
store the response as f [w] = Ideal(w,Y ).
7. If id ∈ f [w], respond with an unused tag tg ∈ TC.
Otherwise, respond with a random l-bit tag tg.
The adversary A cannot distinguish B from the simulator
S . Oracles OBexp, and OBPub are identical to their S counterpart.
The oracle OBHG responds with challenge points which are
indistinguishable from uniformly random elements used in
OSHG . Oracles O
B
Hkw and O
S
Hkw
only differ in how they compute
x = zα
−1
in steps 2 and 3. For each input z, x is unique and if
x ∈Ch then z = xα ⇐⇒ 1 = ODLα(x,z). On the other hand,
if x /∈ Ch, then x is not a response from OBHG since it only
responds with challenge points. Knowing the exact value of
x /∈ Ch is not important since both oracles respond with a
random tag. Hence, OBHkw and O
S
Hkw
are indistinguishable.
A simulation failure means that A has asked q+1 queries
corresponding to q+1 keywords {(zi,wi)}i∈[q+1] without ask-
ing more than q queries from Oexp. The oracle OBHG ensures
that each wi maps to a unique element xi from the challenge
points, and B asks one OCDH query per Oexp query. Therefore,
B produces q+1 DH pair {(xi,zi = xαi )|xi ∈Ch}i∈[q+1], with
at most q queries from OCDH with probability equal to A’s
advantage ε. This shows that ε < µ. If ε is non-negligible,
then B breaks the One-more-Gap-DH assumption.
B The limits of document search
We show that even with ideal searches an adversary can re-
cover documents or even extract the whole corpus. We formal-
ize the extraction problem as follows: an adversary receives
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a list of n keywords U = {a1, ..,an} and a search oracle O
which respond to queries using the server’s set of N docu-
ments Docs= {d1, ..,dN}. The adversary’s goal is recovering
the document set Docs. Since the adversary is only interested
in the set U of keywords, we ignore any keyword outside of
this set in our analysis.
B.1 One-bit search extraction
In this section, we consider a 1-bit search oracle O which
returns a boolean answer for each query which determine
whether at least one matching document exists. The oracle
support one operation, query, which takes a set of keywords
P as input and returns boolean answer 0/1← O.query(P). If
there are two documents Dx and Dy in the document set Docs
such that Dx ⊂Dy, then the smaller document Dx is not visible
to the adversary. Therefore, we assume that Docs does not
contain any pair of document where one entirely covers the
second one. Furthermore, we only recover documents with
a document uniqueness number uD less than the uniqueness
limit ulim.
A set of keywords P corresponds to a document if and only
if this set returns a positive search result O.query(P) = 1 and
adding any other keyword to this set P results in a negative
response ∀x ∈U,x /∈ P : O.query(P∪{x}) = 0.
Document recovery. If an adversary has partial knowledge
about a document D that contains m keywords in total and the
adversary wants to recover the rest of the document, then the
adversary needs to ask at least t = n−m and at most n queries
from the oracle which leads to a Θ(n) query complexity. We
claim that the adversary needs to ask at least one query for
each keyword which is not inside the document, i.e., that
it must make at least t = n−m queries. We assume to the
contrary that the adversary recovers the document with less
than t queries and show that there are two possibilities for
D that it cannot distinguish. Since the number of queries is
smaller than t, there exists a keyword x /∈ D which either is
not queried or it has been queried, but in each of these queries
x was queried together with at least one other keyword y
such that y /∈ D (leading to the oracle returning 0). In both
cases, the adversary cannot distinguish the document D from
the document D∪ x since they both conform to all queries.
Therefore, the adversary needs to make at least t queries.
Clearly, n queries suffice. Showing the result.
Algorithm 1 recovers a document with n queries. The doc-
ument starts with a known set of keywords P and then keeps
extending this set with keywords from the remaining set
{ak, ..,an} as long as the oracle keeps returning 1. Eventually,
the algorithm returns a maximal extension of the initial set P.
Corpus extraction. Knowing a partial document P, it is sim-
ple to expand it to one document, but extracting all possible
documents from this set is hard. The reason behind this is
that when the adversary adds another keyword ax to the set P
and receives a positive query response, he cannot determine
Algorithm 1 Recover the rest of the document given a keyword set
{ak, ..,an}.
Start : RECOVERDOCUMENT(P,1)
function RECOVERDOCUMENT(P,k)
for i← k . . .n do
if O.query(P∪{ai}) = 1 then
P← P∪{ai}
return P
Algorithm 2 Extract non-contained documents with an uniquness number
uD smaller than ulim with a one-bit search oracle based on the keyword set
S = {a1, ..,an}.
Start: EXTRACT( /0, /0,1)
function EXTRACT(D,P,k)
if |P|= ulim then
if ISINDOCS(P,D) = 1 then
return D
for i← k . . .n do
if O.query(P∪{ai}) = 1 then
D← EXTRACT(D,P∪{ai}, i+1)
if |P|< ulim then
D← EXTRACT(D,P, i+1)
if ISINDOCS(P,D) = 0 then
D← D∪{P}
return D
function ISINDOCS(P,k)
for all d ∈ D do
if P⊆ d then
return 1
return 0
whether all documents that match ax also match P∪ ax; or
there exists a document which only contains P, but not P∪ax.
We designed a corpus extraction algorithm that takes care
of this uncertainty, see Algorithm 2. This recursive algo-
rithm is called with the current set of documents D, the set
of keywords P that it is currently considering, and the in-
dex k into the list of keywords (the keywords with index
less than k have already been considered). To find all docu-
ments with respect to the set of keywords S = {a1, . . . ,an},
call EXTRACT( /0, /0,1).
The algorithm is recursive. It considers the current set of
keywords P and tries to extend it with a keyword ai (k≤ i< n).
If the oracle returns 0, clearly there is no document matching
P∪{ai}. If the oracle returns 1, we cannot distinguish the
two cases above, so we recurse along both paths, one for
documents that contain ai, and the other for documents that
do not contain ai. If we reach the uniqueness limit ulim, we
check if D already contains a document containing the current
set P (by calling IsInDocs to check), if so we stop because
we extracted this document already. Otherwise we continue
extending P, but no longer branch (as |P| ≥ ulim), to find all
keywords as in the RecoverDocument function in Algorithm 1.
If we exhausted all possible keywords, we add P to the current
set of documents D and return.
We argue that this algorithm finds all documents with
uniqueness number uD < ulim. Clearly, the algorithm explores
all sets P of size less than ulim for which there exist match-
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ing documents. So, eventually, the algorithm will find the
unique set for each document, which it will then extend to the
corresponding full document.
It is easy to see that the brute-force part, while |P|< ulim re-
quires at most O(nulim) queries. However, the algorithm does
not expand keyword sets with negative responses, and on aver-
age, document sparsity leads to a significantly lower number
of queries. Once |P| ≥ ulim the algorithm enters a linear ex-
ploration, as it stops branching. It runs through this linear
phase for every document. Resulting in a total complexity of
O(nulim+nd).
B.2 #doc search extraction
In this section, we consider a #doc search oracle O which
returns the number of matching documents for each query.
The oracle only supports one operation, query, which takes a
set of keywords P as input and returns the number of matching
documents t← O.query(P).
Document recover. Since the 1-bit search oracle’s output can
be computed from the #doc oracle, the algorithms from the
previous section also work against the #doc search oracle. As
a matter of fact, when only considering a single document, the
behavior of the #doc oracle is equivalent to that of the 1-bit
search oracle, there RECOVERDOCUMENT in Algorithm 1 is
also optimal for the #doc system in recovering documents.
Corpus extraction. The extra information provided by the
#doc oracle, however, helps create a much more efficient cor-
pus extraction function. In particular, an attacker is no longer
faced with the uncertainty when it only has a one bit oracle.
Given an existing set of keywords P, the attacker can query
P∪ax and see if the number of matching documents changes,
or not. If the number of matching documents changes, there
were documents that match P but not P∪ax. If the number
Algorithm 3 Extract all matches documents which include the partial docu-
ment P, with a #doc search oracle based on the keyword set S = {a1, ..,an}.
Start : EXTRACT( /0, /0,1,∞)
function EXTRACT(D,P,k,matches)
for i← k,n do
next= O.query(P∪{ai})
if next> 0 then
D← EXTRACT(D,P∪{ai}, i+1,next)
if matches> next then
D← EXTRACT(D,P, i+1,matches−next)
return D
return D∪{P}
of matching documents stays the same, all documents that
match P also match P∪ax.
Algorithm 3 exploits this principle. It keeps track of the
current set of documents D, the set of keywords P that it is
currently considering, the index k into the list of keywords
(the keywords with index less than k have already been con-
sidered), and the number matches of documents that con-
tain the current set of keywords P. To find all documents
with respect to the set of keywords S = {a1, . . . ,an}, call
EXTRACT( /0, /0,1,∞).
Given the current set P with matches matching documents
it proceeds as follows. It asks the next keyword ai, if there
are still matching documents (i.e., next> 0 ) it adds ai to P
and continues exploring. If some documents matched P but
did not match P∪ai (i.e., matches> next), the algorithm also
continues exploring by skipping the keyword ai.
In the beginning, the algorithm starts with an empty set and
checks every keyword which requires n queries, and it contin-
ues with a deterministic document recovery for d documents.
Therefore, this algorithm requires a total of O(nd) queries for
extracting the corpus.
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